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ABSTRACT
Over the last 70 years there has been a major shift in the threats to global peace. While the 1950’s and 1960’s
were characterised by the cold war and the arms race, many security threats are now characterised by group
behaviours that are disruptive, subversive or extreme. In many cases such groups are loosely and chaotically
organised, but their ideals are sociologically and psychologically embedded in group members to the extent
that the group represents a major threat. As a result, insights into how human groups form, emerge and
change are critical, but surprisingly limited insights into the mutability of human groups exist. In this paper
we argue that important clues to understand the mutability of groups come from examining the evolutionary
origins of human behaviour. In particular, groups have been instrumental in human evolution, used as a basis
to derive survival advantage, leaving all humans with a basic disposition to navigate the world through social
networking and managing their presence in a group. From this analysis we present five critical features of
social groups that govern mutability, relating to social norms, individual standing, status rivalry, ingroup bias
and cooperation. We argue that understanding how these five dimensions interact and evolve can provide new
insights into group mutation and evolution. Importantly, these features lend themselves to digital modeling.
Therefore computational simulation can support generative exploration of groups and the discovery of latent
factors, relevant to both internal group and external group modelling. Finally we consider the role of online
social media in relation to understanding the mutability of groups. This can play an active role in supporting
collective behaviour, and analysis of social media in the context of the five dimensions of group mutability
provides a fresh basis to interpret the forces affecting groups.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is well-recognised that the common threats to world peace have dramatically changed over the last 70 years.
The beginning of this period was dominated by the cold war and its associated arms race. Clearly defined by
identifiable actors, formal administrations, territorial boundaries and observable behaviour, the cold war allowed
analysts and strategists to successfully model rational behaviour and understand the dynamics through game
theory.1 While not directly diminishing the threat, the resultant insights offered an important contribution for
policy makers and stakeholders to rationalise the conflict and assess the outcomes of strategy.
Moving to the present day, the cold war threats have been replaced by instabilities that are much more
challenging to explicitly model and understand.2 Obfuscated by the human dynamics involving a large number
of dispersed and often hidden actors, the disruptive behaviour of subversive and extreme groups now threaten
regional stability in numerous locations across the globe, being characterized as asymmetric warfare. Unlike the
cold war where advancement in nuclear technology supported a singular threat, these groups are often regressive,
reverting to primitive forms of warfare and ideals, employing forms of violence spanning from hate to terror,
combined with use modern technology such as social media to reach beyond their physical group. This behaviour
is often accompanied by informal and chaotic internal group organisation, accompanied by reinforcement of the
group’s ideology through sanctions that could be extreme.
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The seemingly chaotic nature of such groups is confounded by their ability to quickly establish, adapt their
character, fragment and combine. Broadly speaking, we refer to the associated dynamics as mutability, repre-
senting the ways in which these groups emerge and change. The problem of understanding important instabilities
in world security today therefore involves understanding the mutability of groups. However, defining a single
unifying framework for group behaviour is unlikely to be feasible. Instead it is more realistic to identify impor-
tant concepts in sociology and psychology that translate into the computational domain and which allow us to
investigate how mutability occurs in large groups. This is a complex challenge that spans many disciplines, and
would benefit from an overarching strategy.
In this paper we argue that important factors in understanding the mutability of groups arise from examining
the primeval origins of human behaviour. Specifically human evolution has been predicated on sustaining and
exploiting large groups, and thousands of generations of natural selection have left humans with a basic disposition
to navigate the world through social networking and managing their presence in a group, through which they can
benefit from a coalition. From considering the origins of human social groups, we present five critical features
through which changes in groups can be framed, modeled and assessed. These concern social norms, individual
standing, status rivalry, ingroup bias and cooperation, around which an individual’s social decision making occurs
and collective behaviours emerge.
While these features are implicit in previous narratives (e.g.,3), in this paper we examine and relate these
features. As they can be computationally represented, we argue that harnessing them through digital modeling
can support causal explanations (rather than correlative ones) for group evolution. Furthermore, such modelling
supports the identification of possible latent factors that may affect the evolution of group behaviour. Finally
we consider the role of online social media in relation to understanding the mutability of groups. In particular
this media can play an active role in supporting group mutability, and analysis of social media in the context of
the proposed mutable dimensions provides a fresh basis to interpret the features of groups.
1.1 Examples of current approaches to modelling groups
Modelling a group is challenging: groups are composed of many individuals that are complex in their own right,
with the brain providing an advanced “cognitive architecture” that moderates how individuals perceive and
respond to the world. In particular the brain enables complex and higher level functions such as consciousness
(e.g., implicit information fusion4), self-awareness (e.g., identity5) and feelings (e.g., emotional intelligence6) that
augment and influence personal reasoning. These powerful functions allow human beings to navigate the world
by extrapolating sophisticated interactions with each other. This leads to distinctive collective behaviours, many
of which are captured through sociological and psychological theory, providing a basis for modelling groups with
greater realism to possible scenarios. However this pursuit is very much in its infancy.
While individual behaviours contribute to the existence and characteristics of a group, a group itself represents
more than the sum of its individual members. In everyday life there are may examples where individuals would be
unlikely to an act in a particular manner without the presence, both in terms of influence and solidarity, of a group:
protests and picket lines are well-used examples. An immediate question arising is how one should attempt to
model this, so that the dynamics of social forces can be better understood. This represents a continuum between
modelling the interactions of individual actors independent of groups, as opposed to recognising a group as an
entity in its own right with characteristics capable of influence or action on others.
Based on extending isolated individual behaviours, modelling psychological interactions between actors has
been an important approach. One of the most important contributions in this regard has been Social Impact
Theory, proposed by Latane´.7 This has provided a useful quantitative framework that creates agency between
individuals based on their psychological influence. This is based on four dimensions: the degree to which an
individual is influenced by and influences others; the ability to persuade people with opposing beliefs to change
their views; the ability to support others with similar beliefs and their position in the social structure.
Social Impact Theory has been useful in examining social interactions in specific contexts such as opinion
formation, beliefs and culture.8,9 This general approach follows modelling in computational theoretical physics,
where effectively people replace particles, and macro-level phenomenon are observed from micro-level interaction
that is forced by physical constraints (e.g., time, space). Through an associated set of governing equations,
Social Impact Theory has achieved convenient quantification of potential psychological behaviour. However
further flexibility in modelling behaviour, constraints and features, including those of groups is highly desirable.
This can be achieved though extending the cognition that agents possess, and the social attributes included in
the model.10–12
Alexrod’s agent-based modelling approaches (e.g.,13,14) demonstrate this to good effect. A particularly
interesting example15 includes group identity as a dormant trait, whose presence is determined to be an important
latent feature in the emergence of ethnocentrism. Alexrod’s work also highlights the importance of evolutionary
modelling, specifically that as well as biological inheritance of characteristics, cultural effects can take place
through social learning. Observing such evolution in simplified models has identified strong underlying rules
that are sufficient to influence group behaviour. Modelling with simplicity appears to have been an important
factor: additional parameters that could be sought in the pursuit of a closeness to reality haven’t detracted from
observing fundamental effects.
At the other end of the individual-group modelling spectrum is the biologically inspired “Blau space”.16 This
model involves a vector of socio-demographic variables for each participant and characteristics of groups. The
approach functions based on homophily - that is those with similar socio-demographic characteristics are more
likely to be associated by involvement in similar groups. Blau spaces project this information and find equilibrium
between potentially competing groups, using a system of differential equations to derive a competition matrix
between finite resources (individual participation). This avoids extensive data collection about the social network
relations, and allows generative analysis of changes to demographics. This approach also circumvents the event-
based modelling approach, where features arise as the consequence of actions, as seen in Social Impact Theory
and the evolutionary insights of Axelrod.
System dynamics has also been adopted as a useful means to understand the non-linear relationships behind
the forces influencing group behaviour.17 This approach involves defining a bounded problem scenario and
eliciting the “stocks and flows” which are the abstract representations of virtual (or physical) commodities and
their local connection and influence. Originating from industrial dynamics this approach allows for the effects
of feedback to be observed for scenarios where linear models are insufficient. System dynamics can be applied
at a high level where individuals are not explicitly recognised, and instead the relationships between groups
take precedence. Hybrid approaches to modelling have also emerged,18,19 which seek to span the modelling
spectrum. These seek to combine multiple cognitive models capturing individual decision making with feedback
and influence from a wider context, through systems dynamics. With such layered complexity embedded within
the model, accuracy and effectiveness becomes a function of correctly parameterising and weighting a wide range
of variables.
Social Impact Theory, the work of Axelrod, Blau spaces and system dynamics are exemplars demonstrating
how social and behavioural insights can be gleaned through computational models. The generative nature of
these methodologies is attractive20 because it enables social forecasting for specific scenarios. This can support
and augment experts and qualitative approaches such as the Delphi method.21 However, concerning group
behaviour, current progress in forecasting is at a formative stage. In scientific areas such as weather and climate,
where great improvements in forecasting of natural systems are evident, progress has been made from combined
advances in modelling, observational data and computational resources. Turning to social forecasting, advances
in each of these areas are now equally possible, with developments in modelling being fundamental.
1.2 The emerging challenge - characterising groups
A particular imperative concerns establishing conventions that allow groups, as well as individuals, to be explicitly
understood in terms of fundamental attributes, features and interactions within such models. Understanding
which theories are most relevant, the balance between competing theories and the applicability of subjective or
qualitative frameworks remains open. Arguably these are weaknesses that carry over to the current computational
modelling literature, where the dominant frame of reference is the individual actor rather than a group. This is
divergent from theory in sociology and psychology that explicitly recognises the role of groups and their identity
as fundamental. For example, the act of showing commitment to a group, regardless of its rationality, can become
an overriding goal for those that are entirely dependent on their role within that group.22 Group identities come
into play in this context, and are known to dominate over an individuals identity particularly in situations of
intergroup conflict.
Better computational understanding of groups as entities in their own right is needed for assessment of
dynamic situations. For example, explicitly modelling groups as a unit of scale allows simulation to change
resolution, and focuses on the agency held by a group, which comes into play when individuals are disposed to
interacting based on their group’s identity, such as in disruptive and extreme scenarios.23,24 This is required
so that we can make group-level comparisons (both inter-group and intra-group), to better understand group
mutability and assess high-level generative scenarios.
However this raises the question as to the most appropriate and useful dimensions to characterise groups.
Furthermore, establishing dimensions that capture the essence of human groups is a challenge in itself. Logically
though, the origin, purpose and function of groups from an evolutionary perspective offers a rationale as to why
groups are useful to humans. The role that groups have played in evolution is significant and groups have a
profound influence on the rationality of human behaviour.22 Therefore to establish useful dimensions to assess
mutability, we revert to examining the origins of human groups.
2. THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN GROUPS
The modern human, or homo-sapien primate, emerged around 250,000 years ago, intertwined with the arrival
of language25 which allowed the species to sustain larger groups compared to their ancestors. Consistent with
this, humans approach and frame their interaction with others in today’s world as a consequence of thousands
of years of evolution, that has conditioned the traits on which behaviour is predicated. In particular humans are
distinguished among primates by their extreme prosocial disposition,26 seeking to gain security and advantage
in their world based on interactions with others. This is embedded in human culture,27 evolving from ancestors
who were Pleistocene hunter-gatherers.28 Here the benefits of coalitions were felt from defence and hunting in
an environment fraught with the risk of predator attack.3
When resources were scarce and threats significant, the ability to successfully work in groups provided a
means to increase survival prospects.29 Without establishing bonds for sound relationships, individuals were
more vulnerable to free-riders and exploitation, which is easier to monitor when groups are small.30 Conse-
quently bonding with others, and donating time to show commitment,31 have been a fundamental element of
creating and sustaining relationships.32 Clusters of such tightly connected relationships in our ancestral groups
provided a community defence where allies had an increased obligation to faithfully service all their intercon-
nected relationships.
The formation and sustenance of relationships is often seen today based on bonding through commonality of
some description. Known as homophily,33 this results in groups being defined around cultural issues, as well as
geographical factors and extended kinship. This means that groups can potentially define and function as entities
that represent ideologies and practices where individuals within them act and respond under their influence.24
Interestingly however, complex barriers exist that prevent convergence to a single group that has a unified cultural
view:14 for example polarisation was found to increase when there are limited attributes associated with the
culture available to a population. Understanding how such polarisation manifests itself, particularly in extreme
forms, therefore remains important for the future.
2.1 The Social Brain
The capacity for a group to emerge and change is driven by the cognitive behaviour of its members in response
to the context that they face both internally and externally, from potential collaborators and adversaries, as well
as the group itself.34 This cognitive capacity has been shaped by the need for humans to survive in a group
setting, resulting in distinctive social cognition, commonly called the human social brain.35
Prospering in large groups is not straight forward: as a group enlarges, the defence system provided by a
tightly knit social network weakens because maintaining relationships with many others is a major cognitive
challenge36 and social knowledge from direct observation isn’t always possible. This gives opportunity to free-
riders, who can exploit others and move on before their reputation catches up with them through communication
in a social network. Consequently individuals that are more advanced in judging others based on limited feedback,
or those who have cognitive capabilities to sustain large social networks, are generally less likely to be exploited,
thereby protecting their resources and enhancing chances of reproductive success. In other words, social cognition
is likely to have acted as a selection pressure.
The complexity of the social cognitive challenge of assessing others is reflected in the large relative size of the
human brain as compared to other species. Humans live in the largest social groups of all primates, typically
around 150 in size.37 A fundamental correlation has been identified that shows a relationship between the social
complexity of a species and the associated neocortex ratio.38 This represents the frontal lobes of the brain that
are responsible for social activity, as a proportion of the total brain size. When taking the typical group size
that a species maintains as a proxy for social complexity, this has led to the Social Brain Hypothesis,39 which
argues that human intelligence evolved as a means of surviving and reproducing in large and complex groups.
After 250,000 years of homo-sapien evolution, where natural selection has been influenced by social intel-
ligence, the brain now provides an instinctive compulsion for humans to understand the world from a social
perspective.40 We think about ourselves in relation to those around us with remarkable insight. For example,
we can preempt thinking of people we know,41 ascribe intentions42 and make wide ranging social judgements.43
We can connect with the pleasure or pain felt by others and anticipate their position and views.44 Furthermore,
social cognition is the default state for the brain,45 leading us to naturally ruminate about others. Therefore so-
cial reasoning plays an important role in how groups emerge and mutate. Combined with a wide range of factors
such as individual differences, culture, social learning and context, there is significant complexity to consider.
Therefore frameworks through which groups can be considered are highly valuable.
3. DIMENSIONS FOR CONSIDERING GROUP MUTABILITY
The evolutionary background to social groups shows how humans have used groups as a means to promote survival
prospects. Although in the contemporary literature there is no singular and universal model that describes how
“modern humans” interact in groups, arguably some of the most profound and original sociological understanding
in this area was framed by George Homans.46 Holmans’ thesis resonates with the human evolutionary origins,
where he identifies factors such as control, authority, reciprocity and ritual as fundamental elements through
which the outcomes of social interaction can be examined. This was continued by Homans’ further work47 where
he used reinforcement and exchange as the basis to examine cooperation. This work remains highly relevant
today, and is influential in our framing of the factors through which groups mutate. We hypothesise that (at
least) five dimensions interact and support group evolution, namely social norms, individual standing, status
rivalry, ingroup bias and cooperation. We present these in the following Sections (Sections 3.2-3.5), and propose
these dimensions as ways in which the essence of groups can be characterised, assessed and compared.
3.1 Social norms
Social norms are critical to the functioning of groups and the dynamics between groups. These are the often
unspoken and unwritten rules that represent acceptable behaviour to a collection of people, encompassing their
expectations and values, as viewed from their own perspective. Norms indicate what a group expects as “normal”
behaviour and contribute to reducing uncertainty on the rules and social actions that a society follows.48
Social norms represent a group-level belief system, acknowledged as a powerful sociological and psychological
phenomenon.34 These are readily observed in societies and groups, being fundamental to the culture that a
group sustains.49 However explaining why people comply with social norms and even promote or enforce them,
particularly when this involves resource implications to the individual,50 has remained a central puzzle in social
theory,34 social psychology51 and theoretical biology.52 Although this picture is still being built and has many
facets, research has addressed aspects such as conditions for their stability and enforcement within a group.13
Characterising the social norms of a group is fundamentally important because they represent the potential
impact of a group’s behaviour on itself and others, including the consequences of non-compliance. Of all the
different types of behaviour that a social norm may encompass, arguably the most important are the behavioural
expectations towards their own members (i.e., ingroup) and others beyond (i.e., outgroup), as further considered
in Section 3.4. These define the extent of a tolerant, and functional society, and relations between groups.
Social norms naturally emerge, but may be enforced on a population as an instrument of control, such as in an
authoritarian or insurgent regime.
Based on common belief and values, a social norm may itself define a group and attract membership, or equally
norms may culturally emerge from within a pre-existing group fuelled by ongoing interactions or similarity of
traits. It is normally the case that individuals will belong to a wide range of different groups, ranging from
demographics, interests and other characteristics. Social identity theory53 proposes that an individual’s sense of
identity is driven by the groups to which they belong. Originating in24 Tajfel et al propose that the pursuit of
social identity through groups occurs as a consequence of seeking self-enhancement, particularly concerning belief
supporting superiority of one’s own group (ingroup bias), and uncertainty reduction, by using group affiliation
as a proxy to represent one’s beliefs and communicate this to others.
Although social norms exist in many forms, often being both culturally important and benign (e.g., lifestyle
related such as fashion or music), extreme and disruptive group behaviours can also emerge, representing a
significant violation of decency and humanity. These may sustain forms of aggression, from discrimination
through to violence and conflict, which in turn can range from hate through to terrorism. In these extreme
cases, social norms represent a threat to security and freedom, which is a feature of current day warfare.
Modelling of social norms in this context remains at a formative stage. Ethnographic contributions have
enabled insight into the process by which individuals become psychologically induced into groups characterised
by extreme norms,54,55 while established political insights have examined the discourse that accompanies the
emergence of such groups and their relations.24
3.2 Individual standing
Within a group, despite often seeing commonality among members, it is rarely the case that individuals are
respected equally by their peers or external group members. Individual standing captures how an individual is
thought about from the perspective of a third party, with respect to trusting another to be faithful to particular
social norms (Section 3.1). Stratification may contribute to this, representing a grouping with which an individual
identifies. Action to promote standing and in response to standing fuel ingroup dynamics. Standing is assessed
by the extent of one’s reputation, which is the perceived evidence supporting ones belief about another person’s
intentions. The group(s) to which an individual belongs may also influence this, and the human predisposition
is to more highly value affiliation with ones own group (Section 3.4).
Reputation assessment is an instinctive human pursuit that triggers neurological effects.56 It informs trust
in others and more widely it supports the concept of intentionality,42 which is the inference of motives and
beliefs that people hold in respect of each other. Intentionality functions as the belief system allowing humans
to socially hypothesize, a distinguishing feature of human cognition. Within this, comparing reputation plays a
significant role in how people choose to understand each other and themselves (Section 3.3), allowing humans to
engage in analysis and make wide ranging social judgements.43 This is critical to internal group rivalry (Section
3.3), where individuals compete to obtain power within a group.
In sociology reputation has received little systematic attention,57 with wide ranging alternative definitions.
However definitions often tend to capture the idea of making an assessment of future behaviour based on past
history. This has high relevance in economics where investment decision making can be influenced.58 In this
context reputation effectively holds the role of a currency, acting as a memory and asset that allows the resources
of others to be accessed in future, making reputation management strategically important to the individual.59
In a group context, commentators note60 that reputation plays an important role in alliance formation to
sustain cooperation in groups populated beyond genetic relatives. Here reputation acts as a signalling system
to a wider population who may not have a history of direct observation from previous interactions. This is
particularly important when donating resources to help a third party, and thus arises in cooperative scenarios
(Section 3.5). Informed decision making is important, both to ensure one’s own resources are conserved and that
one’s own reputation in the eyes of others is not diminished by inappropriate behaviour towards others. This
will be shaped in a group by the social norms (Section 3.1) which may extend to cooperative expectations.
3.3 Status rivalry
Status rivalry, reflecting competition for social power and dominance, can occur between individuals in a group
or between groups (Section 3.4). When rivalry escalates within a group, this can be accompanied with conflict
and potential division into new groups. The dynamic that supports this is fuelled by the social capital that
adversaries can lever from within the group. Social capital broadly relates to the resources that are accumulated
through cooperative relationships held with others, reflecting an individual positioning within a social network.
Knowing the nature of relationships with other people determines ones position with regard to social capital
within a social network, informing the commitment that can be meaningfully devoted towards others, as well as
informing our expectations of others and determining their position.
Social capital is predicated on investment in social relations with expected returns.61 Its values lies in
facilitation of information, exertion is influence of agents and in signaling the social credentials or standing
(Section 3.2). Authors such as Burt62 and Bourdieu63 have explored the sociological and economic implications
of social capital and the reader is referred to associated works for more in depth analysis. However, from a group
perspective, social capital is broadly characterised as bridging and bonding, based on potential link strength
with another party.64 Bridging social capital represents connection between different types of actors, such as
those in different groups, where as bonding social capital reflects homophily and connection between those with
similar traits. Both these relationships can yield considerable power for those involved, with bridging social
capital reflecting the strength of weak ties65 and bonding social capital reflecting a likelihood of leveraging
cooperation.66
Particularly in chaotic, dynamic or unstable environments, there is a considerable evolutionary incentive to
gain advantage by closely monitoring adversaries that may exist ingroup. Sustaining network knowledge comes
from sizing up other group members; so called social comparison is the process of judging third parties relative
to oneself, which is used by humans to inform decision making, feelings and perceptions of ourselves and group
members. Research in this area dates back to Festinger,67 and it has expanded to become an important field in
its own right.68 It is dependent on a persistent frame of reference provided by ones own view of the world, where
cues are used to understand the reputation and standing of ones counterparts, and may arise through numerous
means including gossip.69 The dimensions through which social comparison is undertaken also gives insight into
the nature of the group’s norms, beliefs and values (Section 3.1).
The widespread disposition to undertake social comparison points to its important evolutionary role in sus-
taining human groups.70 It is phylogenetically ancient71 and embedded in human survival, with its suggested
origins in evaluating competitors and assessing whether or not to commit resources to challenge a rival in the
groups’ hierarchy. Skills in social comparison also provide an advantage in understanding ones social position
and the relationships to prioritise,71 which is of high importance when choosing to donate limited resources in
support of another. Continued re-assessment of comparators and deliberation over observed social positioning
in large groups requires significant cognitive resources relative to other species,72 consistent with the unusually
large brain size in humans compared to other all other species73 and indicating our predisposition to this.
These cognitive skills are likely to be well-exercised by members of groups where instability is commonplace
and violence is used in rivalry to control relationships and assert status. Equally in authoritarian regimes,
challenges to power may typically result in responses to brutally reinforce control over rivals. Therefore the
social and political context of power, and the agency held by individuals, informs the potential and way in which
groups will evolve.
3.4 Ingroup bias
A consequence of evolutionary selection based on successful groups is a well-recognised disposition for humans to
disproportionately preference the characteristics of their own group, known as ingroup bias. Such characteristics
include a disposition that ones own group may hold the “correct” world view, while assuming the values of held
by others do not have the same legitimacy or are somehow flawed. Confidence in superiority of the ingroup’s
capabilities is also reflected through this phenomenon.74,75 The disposition toward ingroup bias has emerged as
an evolutionary consequence of reducing risk by preference for those with which stronger ties are held.
A longstanding literature captures evidence of ingroup bias, and it is well-known for its potentially disruptive
effects76 while also being promoted through natural selection.15 ingroup bias functions as a form of social com-
parison at group level, with the comparison being made against the outgroup. This phenomenon of distinguishing
between the ingroup and outgroup has been fundamental to developing what is arguably the most comprehensive
psychological theory that explains intergroup conflict,24 which captures status rivalry between groups.
Tajfel et al’s theory of intergroup conflict considers a continuum along which individuals interact: described
at one extreme as interpersonal, where individual interactions are independent of group affiliations, verses in-
tergroup, where interactions between individuals are fully determined by the group affiliations of the associated
individuals. It is observed that the more extreme the conflict, the more likely individuals will be represented by
their respective group identities. The theory identifies a psychological rationale that contribute to conflict.
The theory characterises inter-group conflict by considering the agency that individuals in a society have for
movement between groups (i.e., the extent of social mobility verses barriers from stratification). This is deemed
important because lack of individual agency will encourage individuals to consider themselves through the groups
that they are associated with, rather than through their own individual identities. Intergroup conflict aligns with
low social mobility, where greater uniformity of individuals through adoption of group rather than individual
identities will be shown to members of their relevant outgroup.
Scenarios where Tajfel et al’s theory identifies conflict emerging are consistent with the profound work of
Gordon Allport,77 who proposed that prejudice between groups could be diminished by contact between mem-
bers of those groups. This was deemed effective when interacting individuals have equal status, are cooperative,
have common goals and are supported by underlying institutions. Considerable further development of Inter-
group Contact Theory has since been accomplished, with Pettigrew78 identifying four change processes based on
learning about the outgroup, changing behaviour to allow interaction, creating opportunity for human-to-human
relationships and reconsideration of the ingroup.
Contributions characterising inter-group conflict and the role of contact can be used to interpret the extent of
integration that a group possesses and to what extent this represents a threat. The extent to which individuals
adopt the group identity, and the nature of the group’s social norm and cooperative stance (Section 3.5) combine
to provide assessments that over time may signal the extent of tensions emerging. The relationship between
an individuals identity and their group identity has become an important emerging focus in the literature79
with identity fusion theory providing a useful framework. This focuses on the interplay between an individuals
personal identity (who I am) and their social identity (the group to which I belong), assessing the permeability
and interplay between these two factors. This impacts on the extent to which individuals categorize themselves
and others through their group affiliation. Being able to characterise the nature and level of outgroup distortion
that a group possesses, in terms of affective, behavioural and cognitive signals is therefore useful when assessing
changes to a group’s role in relation to others.
3.5 Cooperation
Cooperation is an inherently human disposition and is fundamental to sustaining coalitions, which represent
alliances for mutual benefit to those involved and allow groups to function. Evolution has provided genetic
wiring, in the form of the social brain (Section 2.1) that results in neurological effects from cooperation actions.80
How humans exhibit cooperative behaviour, with whom and in what form provides insight into the nature of
groups to which they belong. Additionally, beyond defection and shirking, acts of conflict sit polar opposite
to cooperation, involving resource removal or destruction rather than donating resources to others. Therefore
understanding cooperation and conflict are very much related through this continuum of behaviour.
The potential cooperative behaviour of individuals in a group can also be thought of as finite resource,
combining time and cognitive capability to maintain relationships with others. Therefore how actions are chosen,
the extent of focus ingroup or outgroup and the positivity, negativity or extremism that is associated with
behaviour strongly characterise the nature of a group. Whether actions are associated with individual identity
or group identity may be challenging to assert, but it resonates with observations made in Tajfel’s intergroup
contact theory24 where extreme behaviour is more likely associated with use of a group identity by individuals.
Importantly, cooperation brings together all the previous dimensions of groups as considered in this Section,
and represents the basis around which human groups are sustained. Social norms (Section 3.1) relate to expecta-
tions concerning cooperation with others, extending to hostile and destructive acts, concerning both the ingroup
and outgroup (Section 3.4), as well as the role of punishment when norms aren’t followed. Status rivalry (Section
3.3) is dependent on the social capital available to individuals and is governed by the relationships through which
significant cooperation may be levered. Individual standing (Section 3.2) indicates how people will be judged as
a consequence of their actions towards others, which involves assessing their cooperative and hostile behaviour
and to whom it is focussed (Section 3.4). Therefore characterising cooperative and uncooperative behaviour,
and the associated motivations, are fundamental, providing the building blocks for assessment and modelling.
In the academic literature, identifying the natural conditions that allow cooperation to prosper has been a
considerable research focus, spanning theoretical biology81 through to sociology47 and economics.82 However this
has largely been accomplished in absence of groups or unstable geo-political scenarios but provides some useful
fundamental principles. The most relevant forms of cooperation concerning groups are: direct reciprocity,83,84
which has some relation to social exchange theory in sociology,85 where the receiver of a donation chooses
whether or not to reciprocate; indirect reciprocity,86 which is also related to generalized exchange theory,87
where the reciprocation of a cooperative act arises from a wider population, and strong reciprocity,50 which
involves punishment by group members for divergence from a group’s particular cooperative social norm. These
cooperative phenomena lend themselves to quantitative assessment and modelling, classically taking the form of
game theory, which focuses on behaviour in the context of rational individual objectives, absence of any social
reasoning. This does not render game theory an inappropriate tool, but motivates its adaptation to incorporate
the social strategies that individuals may pursue as a consequence of their presence in particular groups.88
In some sense we can view cooperation as a fundamental way in which the nature of groups can be assessed
and studied on a generative basis. Cooperation has the characteristic of an “atomic element” in the composition
of a group because all behaviours can be judged in this dimension. This does not diminish the importance
of effects and dynamics seen upon groups, such as communication, propaganda and influence propagation, as
these forces may result in effects which shape or change the nature of a group’s cooperative characteristics. A
challenge however remains in detecting events, particularly those of a smaller scale, that represent indicators of
behaviour that are difficult to observe through their latent nature. Although noisy and disconnected from physical
behaviour, social media can provide additional input to the situational understanding of group behaviours, but
requires significant knowledge fusion in the sense that integration needs to be achieved with human knowledge.
However dimensions of mutability offer a potential framework to assess social media to comprehend the role and
significance of communication combined with in-the-field observation. This is considered further in Section 4.
4. EXAMPLES OF ANALYSIS USING THE PROPOSED DIMENSIONS OF
MUTIBILITY
In this section we summarise how the proposed five dimensions of mutibility (Section 3) can relate to the
observed characteristics of groups. Firstly we observe that external forces that are known to affect groups can
be interpreted in terms of the proposed five dimensions. The scope of each dimension in respect of changes to
a group is summarized in Table 1: this presents the type of influence that each dimension may be associated
with, in terms of role and scope. The table shows how different scales of resolution, from the individual actor
through to the internal and external group levels, are concurrently important. Table 3 presents the effects of
three commonly considered external forces that affect how groups function in scenarios related to instability.
These concern access to resources, inequality and political failures. The consequences of these forces on groups
are presented for each of the five dimensions of group mutability, manifesting themselves in slightly different ways
and with different emphasis, depending on the scenario. These are hypothetical scenarios that demonstrate how
group behaviours may be interpreted and provide insight. Using the proposed dimensions of mutability helps
conceptual organization of the effects without supressing the associated complexity of the phenomenon.
4.1 Situational Understanding and Social Media Data
Alongside the often-chaotic organization on the ground, extremist groups and members are using social media to
reinforce their position. Twitter in particular, because of its emphasis on short, easily-consumable, and real-time
Table 1. Preliminary role and scope of dimensions of mutability in assessing groups.
DIMENSION REFLECTION IN GROUP PROVIDES
CHARACTERISITICS BOUNDARIES FOR:
Social Norms The general outlook of a group World view of values, beliefs, social
constraints and sanctions
Cooperation Disposition in terms of aiding or Acts of participation or expression
opposing others of conflict
Ingroup Bias Categorisation of others and Shared identity and extent of similarity
homophilic attraction and differentiation towards others
Status Rivalry Ingroup hierarchy and influential Social power from positioning,
connection to others inequality, resources and control
Individual Standing The currency (e.g., capability, actions, Reputation and how members are
resources) that individuals possess to judged by peers to improve their
gain social traction within their group ingroup status
posts, has emerged as a key source of real-time ‘breaking’ information, often serving as a carrier of links to
other channels, such as mainstream media news items.89 The real-time public dissemination of information (and
misinformation) via social media is having significant impact on the practice of intelligence analysis in relation
to the activities of online groups and movements90 and management of large-scale events.91 Consequently, the
ability to rapidly process and exploit open source information in the context of understanding group behaviour
dynamics has grown in significance in recent years.
Table 2. Interpreting social media signals in a group context.
DIMENSION POTENTIAL SIGNALS AND CONTENT FROM SOCIAL MEDIA
Social Norms Reinforcement of beliefs, values and views.
Exposure of threats, sanctions and use of propaganda.
Cooperation Promotion and reinforcement of participation within a group. Expressions
of opposition, threats and hatred to reinforce conflict and social norms.
Ingroup Bias Targeted discrimination to entrench boundaries between groups. Expressions
of superiority of the ingroup and inferiority of the outgroup.
Status Rivalry Expressions of commitment and following to particular individuals in the
group. Emphasis of differentiation between ingroup competitors.
Individual Standing Content representing the currency that groups recognise in terms of
reputation, status and respect from inside the group.
There are now diverse tools for assessing social media content, which generally provide an observatory func-
tion. While such technology plays a key element in open source intelligence exploitation, especially in the area
of social sensing,92 a tendency to ‘oversell’ its capabilities has been observed93,94 leading to a view that ‘glass
box’ rather than ‘black box’ approaches are required in order to gain robust situational understanding from
open source media.95,96 For example, an analysis of the failure of Google’s ‘Flu Trends’ algorithm in early 2013
pointed to a lack of transparency in both algorithms and social media platforms as being key factors in under-
mining reliability and replicability of analysis results over time.94 Addressing this issue in terms of supporting
situational understanding in relation to group behaviours and activity requires robust models of group dynamics
and in particular mutability.
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.
A feature of this media is the inherent noise associated with typically short messaging and disconnection from
the physical world. As a result interpreting the meaning of content and its relevance to groups is particularly
challenging, leading to generally broad-brush approaches that may involve aspects such as sentiment analysis to
glean overall characteristics around aggregated messaging, that might or might not correlate with activity on
the ground. More generally, interpreting social media content in the context of group behaviour is a problematic
issue. In Table 2, we show how the proposed dimensions of mutability can be used to help interpret and analyse
online group behaviour. This allows the content involved in an individual social media post to be interpreted in
terms of its contribution to group dynamics. Effectively this translates semantic analysis of social media to its
role in a group, existing approaches for which are not well documented.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have focused on developing and understanding characteristics of groups that can be used to
assess changes in groups. Our motivation for considering groups as an important entity goes back to the anthro-
pological literature, where groups have been influential in human evolution and survival. From the contemporary
literature, diverse approaches have been made at modelling groups, each with different points of focus. To assist
in understanding human groups, five dimensions have been proposed that allow complex dynamics to be related
and understood without suppressing the complexity that is inherent in human groups. The organisation of group
characteristics in this manner is useful because it provides a framework for the future development of generative
models of group behaviour, as well as supporting the analysis and interpretation of changes to group behaviour.
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